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Summary findings
Political  change  marked  the difference  between  the  Knowing  where to go helped shape  reform. The
approaches  of the countries  of Eastern  Europe and the  Eastern  European  and Baltic  countries,  wanting  to join
former  Soviet  Union (FSU).  the European  Union  and encouraged  to do so, first
The Baltics  and most Eastern  European  countries  initiated  political  reform,  which led to economic  reform.
wanted to break away from communism  and the FSU  Most FSU  countries,  not knowing  with whom to align,
domination  - so their transition  was characterized  first  initially  saw no choice  but the Russian  Federation.
by political  change.  Communists  were discredited  and  Once reforms  are launched,  the outcomes  are quite
removed  from power,  creating a period of  similar.  Growth starts about two full years  after
"extraordinary  politics"  and a window of opportunity  stabilization,  although  it took about a year longer  in the
for reform.  FSU.  Initial  conditions  are important  to the transition.
The collapse  of the FSU  did not lead to political  Short  to medium-term  prospects  seem  most favorable
change  in most FSU  states.  There were indications  of  to Eastern  Europe  and the Baltics,  although  they still
discontent  with the Union,  but except for the Baltics  have  to catch up with the OECD  countries.  If admitted
these  were not as strong  as in the Eastern  European  to the European  Union,  they may attain high growth
countries  and there were no explicit  demands  for  rates even  in the longer  term.
independence.  The former communists  hoped that the  The FSU  countries  have  even more catching  up to do.
Commonwealth  of Independent  States (CIS)  set up after  In the short to medium  term, countries  with slower
the collapse  of the FSU  would  evolve  into a loose  population  growth rates and strong reform efforts  should
federation,  maintaining  old trade and financial  links.  enjoy  rapid per capita  growth. The Central Asian
Many  FSU  countries  avoided  policies  different  from  countries,  with their high  population growth rates,  need
Russia's.  Most political  leaders  did not initially  think that  economic  growth rates  faster than their population
they would need structural  reform policies  which  could  growth rates.  This leaves  little room for slowing  reform.
diverge  from Russian  policies.  The pace of reform  Given  the benefits  of integration,  there is a strong  case
quickened  only  after the collapse  of the ruble  zone in the  for Central Asian  countries  pushing  for an economic
FSU  in 1993.  union, which  would  also facilitate  the restructuring  of
their economies.
This  paper -a  product of the Development  Research  Group  - is part of a larger  effort  in the group to study  the progress
of transition  economies.  Copies  of the paper are available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC
20433. Please contact Emily Khine, room N11-061, telephone 202-473-7471, fax 202-522-3518, Internet address
kkhine@worldbank.org.  November 1997. (38 pages)
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It is now almost eight years since the transition from plan to market and from one party to
democratic rule has begun in Eastern Europe (EE), and over five years in the former Soviet Union
(FSU). It is widely agreed that this political and economic transition, affecting about one fourth of
the world's population, has been a unique and historic experience'.  In EE political regimes changed
in a very short time ending one party system socialism.  In further east, the collapse of the FSU
resulted in fourteen newly independent states.  Output declines surpassed expectations and some
countries lost more than half of their GDPs by 1995. Over the course of the transition inflation has
reached thousands of percent, especially in FSU countries, sharply lowering wages and hence living
standards.
The scope  and scale of necessary policy reforms to  complete the transition have been
unprecedented. Since the entire economic and political edifice has collapsed, the transition required
a "systemic change; liberalization of tightly controlled prices under socialism, freeing of foreign
trade and opening up current and capital accounts, allowing private sector entry, privatization and
enactment of laws for private property ownership, and restructuring of financial systems. However,
the issue was not simply implementing these reforms.  As noted by Bruno (1993) the main novelty
in EE and FSU lied in "the revolutionary change in  institutions and in the required norms of
economic behavior...", Clearly, this includes, in fact requires, redefining the role of the State, a
major task by itself.
For  a review  of socialist  sytem  and  some  aspects  of  transition  experience  in a historical  context  see  Kornai
(1992).  For  a review  of conceptual  linkages  among  reform  policies  see  Kornai  (1995),  and  Blanchard  (1997).  For  a
comprehensive  review  of  the  economic  issues  during  transition  see  Lavigne  (1995).  Stiglitz(1994)  also  discusses  some
important  aspects  of  transition.  Gros  and  Steinherr(1995)  provide  a thorough  review  of transition  in EE.  Eurpean  Bank
for  Reconstruction  and  Developmet  (EBRD)  provides  a review  of  transition  in  its  annual  Transition  Report  since  1994.
For  a comprehensive  review  of transition,  including  China's  experience,  see  World  Development  Report  (1996).
2On this front, the EE and FSU countries faced different challenges. While the EE countries
were sovereign states prior to the collapse of socialism, with the exception of Russia and the
Baltics,  the FSU states that became sovereign nations after the dissolution of in  1991 faced a
double task: (i) developing an administrative capacity so as to function as a sovereign nation state;
and (ii) creating national economies out of a highly integrated all Union plan based economy and
converting it into a market based one.  Hence, it was clear in the beginning that transition in the
FSU would be more problematic.
To this day, the transition has been an uneven process and cross country experience has
varied significantly.  Despite early difficulties, some countries have made impressive progress.
Almost all EE countries stabilized their economies and by 1994 most were enjoying growth.  In the
FSU, output and inflation performance has been much more variable and transition has been more
difficult as was expected.  With the exception of  a handful of countries, the majority of the
countries in the FSU delayed reforms or adopted reforms gradually, and they suffered higher output
falls and higher inflation than in EE.  Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1995 stabilization efforts
picked up in almost all FSU countries and most  managed to control inflation.  Structural reforms,
however, with the exception of a few countries, have progressed at a  slower pace and growth
performance has not been as strong as in EE.
Against this background, the objective of this paper is  twofold.  As the discussion above
suggests and noted in the literature, reforms and economic outcomes varied widely across countries
and this gave rise to "transition patterns"  in terms of growth and inflation (World Bank). What
accounts for these patterns? Is it largely due to policy variations or inherited initial conditions, or
both?  These questions are the focus of the first part of the paper.  In the second part, the paper
3considers the  growth prospects  of transition economies.  Since they all  suffered from  output
declines and improving welfare requires growth, this issue is high on the agenda for all transition
economies. The focus is on the analysis of factors of that could facilitate or hinder growth based on
the findings of the current empirical growth literature.
The limitations of the data used in this paper and in other transition related studies is well
known and are discussed elsewhere 2. However, since the focus of the paper is on comparative
patterns broadly rather than precise estimates of various aggregates or their analysis, it is thought
that available data could serve the purpose on hand reasonably well.
II. PERFORMANCE DURING THE TRANSITION
This  section provides a  review of  main macroeconomic aggregates, GDP  growth and
inflation rates in the EE and FSU up to  1996.  The data organized according to the Cumulative
Liberalization Index (CLI) originally prepared by de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (DDG).  The CLI is
annual and covers the period between 1989 - 1995. It is composed of three sub-indices and each
vary between zero, representing a centrally planned economy and one, representing a reformed,
market based economy.  These are internal or domestic price liberalization and competition (I);
foreign trade liberalization and current and capital account convertibility  (E) and privatization, new
entry regulations and small and large enterprise development (P). Using these three sub-indices and
assigning them weights (0.3, 0.3, and 0.4 respectively) DDG create a cumulative liberalization
index (CLI) for the same time period.  In this way, the CLI captures both the intensity and duration
of reforms.
2  For  a discussion  of  the  nature  of data  biases  in  transition  countries  see  World  Development  Report  (1996).
4Following this exercise, the countries are grouped into reform categories.  Countries that
were affected by regional tensions or civil wars, are shown separately. The groupings are arranged
by the following values of the CLI:
Group 1: advanced reformers, CL>4
Group 2: (high) intermediate reformers, 2.7<CLI<4
Group 3: (low) intermediate reformers, 1.7<CLI<2.7
Group 4: slow reformers, CLI<1.7
As shown in table 1, when transition started out, 1989 in EE and late 1991 in FSU, there
was a recession in all countries.  This was expected and many analysts pointed this out early in the
transition (Bruno 1991, Fischer and Gelb 1991). What was not expected, however, was the severity
of the declines in output.  Initial years of transition saw massive declines in reported GDP, which
reached to an average of 41 percent of GDP by 1995, as noted by Fischer et al (1996).  In the case
of FSU, output collapse started in  1992 although in most countries output has been falling since
1989.  This  was mainly due  to  the breakdown of  the CMEA trading system, and  given the
interlinked nature of production structure in the FSU, output falls were simply unavoidable early on
in the process.
Inflation has  also increased rapidly initially.  This largely reflected the effects of price
liberalization and hence it was a necessary level adjustment towards international prices. However,
continued increases in prices after the initial spurt largely reflected the effects of monetary financing
of deficits. Only three countries in Europe (Czech Republic) managed to contain inflation in double
5digits throughout. In the FSU inflation first increased in 1991 from previous low levels.  Starting in
1992, price increases reached record levels, with Armeina and Ukraine recording inflation rates of
10,000 percent in the year of maximum inflation. Every country in FSU, except the Baltics, at one
point experienced inflation rates of more than 1000 percent.
Starting in 1992 growth was turned positive in Poland and by 1994 all advanced reformers
were growing strongly which continued in 1995 and  preliminary estimates of output suggest this
trend has contimued in  1996 (EBRD, 1996).  As shown table 1 , the cumulative output drop, at
about 20 percent between 1989 and  1994,  was the  lowest in this group relative to  all other
countries included in this study. The next group, high intermediate reformers also started to grow
in  1994 but this group, on average, registered a cumulative output fall of 35 percent in the same
period.  On the other hand, with the exception of the Kyrgy Republic, low intermediate reformers
were still registering negative growth in 19953.  Moreover, these countries lost half of their output.
Slow reformers seem to have suffered less in terms of output drop but growth was still negative in
1995, and 1996 according to preliminary estimates of GDP in those countries. Not surprisingly,
countries affected by regional conflicts or internal disturbances lost more than half of their output
although some attained relatively high CLI values.
Inflation data, shown in table 2, more or less mirrors the patterns of growth with one major
difference.  That is, in every county whrere growth turned positive, this was preceded by a sharp
fall in inflation rates, or stabilization. In fact, as data shows growth returned in EE about two years
after inflation stabilization was achieved.  In other s in FSU and Mongolia resumption of growth
took longer, about 3 years after stablization which is a year longer than the EE countries.
3  Output  data  does not include  estimates  of the informal  sector  and hence actual  decline  is probably  lower. See  Kaufman  and
Kaliberda  (1996)  for estimates  of the unoffical  economy  in  transition  economies.
6These patterns are also visible if fiscal deficits and and base money data are arranged by the
CLI, which  are presented in  tables 7  and  8.  As  can be  seen, there  was almost one to  one
relationship between fiscal deficits and base money growth.  In the advancded reformers. deficits
are much smaller and the monetary policy is not under pressure to accommodate the deficits. In the
second  and third group deficits are larger but  base money growth was still under control as
domestic and foreign financing were available which in turn depended upon reforms.  The slow
reforming group seem to  have lesser deficits than the  second and third  group but  this  hides
subsidized central bank lending. As shown by  DDG (1996) and reproduced in this paper as table
9, such lending, which is an element of quasi-fiscal deficits, ranged 9-20 percent of GDP in slow
reforrmers  and as a result base money growth was rapid.
III. REFORMS, GROWTH AND INFLATION
What lies at the source of this differential reform, output and inflation performance across
countries? It is obvious that one source is the economic policies followed by countries. To explore
the relationship between policies and outcomes, a cross country regression analysis is carried out
similar to  DDG (1996).  In this  framework growth and inflation equations are estimated as
functions of the CLI and some other control variables.  Since the other source of cross country
variation could be due to initial conditions (ICs), this paper extends the DDG study including
proxies for ICs into the regression equations.
The other variables included in the regression analysis are the following.  In the  first
equation, the dependent variable is the GDP growth rate (GR).  The CLI is the key variable.  A
7positive relationship would be  an  indication of  the beneficial effects of  economic policies or
reforms on growth.  Since overindustrialization was one  of  the features of  centrally planned
economies, the share of industry in GDP (IS) was included in the equations.  The rationale is that
the more industrialized a country, the disruption of trade and financial flows due to the collapse of
planning would be larger and reduce growth rate during the transition period.  In this way the
effects of trade dependence are also captured.
There are two initial condition proxies included in the equations.  The first is a dummy
variable for institutional factors (IF). It is given a value of one for the countries which were market
oriented and sovereign states before becoming socialist countries.  The idea is to understand the
importance of market memory and administrative capacity during the transition.  As noted already
most FSU countries, except the Baltics, were never independent states in their history and this could
be an important determinant of their ability to reform. The second factor considered is the distance,
(DM) from markets.  For this purpose, following Murrell (1996) the distance (in miles) from
Vienna is used.  The goal is to  understand the importance of geographical distance from rich
markets on growth performance. Regional tensions are also captured with a dummy variable (RT).
The following equation is estimated with t ratios in parenthesis:
GR=  -3.2 +  l.9CLI  - 1.2IS  -4.7DM + 3.91F  -9.1RT ......... ..  (1)
(-2.8)  (3.1)  (-2.2)  (-4.2)  (1.9)  (-3.7)
8Adjusted R2: 0.57
For inflation a different specification is proposed.  In addition to the CLI, fiscal deficits
(FD) and repressed inflation (RI) are added. Fiscal deficits are consolidated budget deficits of each
country.  Repressed inflation is calculated by change in wages less change in GDP.  Since only
wage payments were made in cash under central planning, wage rises beyond GDP growth would
mean the accumulation of financial assets by households given shortages of goods.  This is also
known as monetary overhang.  Hence, the  larger the  repressed inflation, the larger the price
increases would be.
The estimated equation is:
LogINF =  3.7 - 4.2CLI + 1.2FD + 2.9RINF + 9RT  ................  (2)
(2.9)  (-2.4)  (4.33)  (1.8)  (2.5)
Adjusted R2: 0.63
According to the results in the first equation, CLI was positively related to growth.  The
coefficient of industry confirms our expectation that more developed countries would face larger
declines in their growth rates.  Both initial condition variables enter with the expected sign.  This
suggest that countries that were not independent states in their history and far from rich markets
suffered more  during the  transition.  This  is  an  important finding as  it  suggests that  initial
9conditions matter  in the transition period and this may have limplications for long run growth
potential of the countries in question.  Regional tension variable enters with a negative sign as
anticipated.  While the estimated coefficient needs to be interpreted with caution as they only
capture broad relationships between the variables used, the large coefficient of regional tension
variable is suggestive  of how much it could add to the decline in the growth rate in addition to other
factors.
Results  of  the  inflation  equation  are  also  in  line  with  our  apriori  expectations.
Comprehensive and sustained reform efforts were negatively related to inflation rates.  Smaller
fiscal deficits also reduce inflation although it is significance level is lower than the CLI coefficient.
This is expected because reforms reduce subsidies which in turn reduce fiscal deficits.  Repressed
inflation enters with a positive sign which suggests that this variable as expected.  Regional tension
(RT) variable has a positive coefficient as expected and highly significant 4
Regressions were also run with the individual components of the index.  The results show
that this does not change the qualitative conclusions and hence they are not presented . In each case
they are significant  and enter with the expected sign. There is a change in the coefficients but this is
relatively small in magnitude.
IV. REFORMS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE: THE LINKS AND THE PROGRESS
The effects of the intensity and duration of reforms on economic structure can be analyzed
by examining three indicators.  The first one  is the share of  services.  Previously, this  was a
repressed sector, and with the liberalization of the economy, it was expected that services would
4Controlling  for  the effects  of different  reform  start dates  did not change  the results.  Hence  time  profile  of inflation  and growth
support  the results  presented  in this paper.  For a description  of the technique  how  this could  be done see DDG  (1996).
10expand rapidly.  As shown in table 3, this was realized and rapidly refonming  economies recording
the largest increases as a percentage in their GDPs.  In fact, given the decline in the shares of
industry and agriculture, it seems that the link between growth and reforms were largely driven by
the growth of the services sector.
The other indicator of structural change is the change in the share of private sector in GDP.
It goes without saying that private sector's share was low under socialism.  However, again there
were differences across countries. In EE, Poland, for example, had a sizable agricultural sector and
private sector accounted for between 30-40 percent in EE before transition began.  In FSU, the
share was quite small averaging about 15-20 percent of GDP at the most.  By 1994, about 3 years
after reforms private sector surpassed 50 percent mark in all advanced reformers and by 1996 this
percentage was up by as much as 75 percent in Czech Republic and Albania  (figure 1). In FSU,
excluding Baltics, this process has been slower and three years after the collapse of the FSU, or in
1995, private sector share as a whole remained relatively low, about 37 percent on average.  Only
Russian Federation had a larger share of private sector than the public sector as of mid-1996.  The
Kyrghz Republic was the second after Russia with 50 percent.
Change in employment is also an indication of adjustment and restructuring. While the data
on employment in FSU is particularly problematic, the broad trends can be observed and compared
to the EE countries.  As shown in table 4, advanced reformers and high intermediate reformers
differ radically on this measure.  Measured unemployment rose steadily between in EE and the
Baltics whereas it  remained at negligible levels in the FSU countries.  While unofficial data
suggests employment is much higher in FSU as well, the registered unemployment data does not
show this.  Since enterprise labor shedding has been much slower in FSU this maybe normal.
11However,  it is evident  that  reallocation  of labor  has been happening  at a more rapid  rate in EE than
FSU.
Taken  together  these patterns  suggest  the following. First, since  service  sector growth  led
the recovery  and this was due to the de novo entry by small and medium  firms  through  new-start
ups and not privatization,  it seems that growth came from reallocation  of resources and hence
increased  efficiency  (Gomulka,  1996). Changes  in investment  ratios  point to the same  conclusion.
As shown  by De Melo  et al (1996)  investment  ratios  fell from around  36 percent  on average  under
socialism  to about 20-25  percent  range over  the course  of transition. The fact that many  transition
countries  are now growing  for the last couple  of years  with these lower  investment  rates is a clear
indication  that investment  efficiency  is much  higher  now  than  before.
The link to reforms  seem  reasonably  straightforward.  In reforming  countries  liberalizing  the
economy  forced  sectors  that suffered  form structural  demand  shift  due to collapse  of communism  to
adjust. At the same, since this involved  the elimination  of subsidies  (hard  budget  constraints),  it
permitted  new and expanding  sectors  to obtain  resources. This in turn supported  growth  in new
new and productive  sectors and moderated  the decline in GDP. Hence, reforming transition
economies  required  simultaneous  implementation  of macro and micro policies. Moreover,  as the
experience  shows,  this did not involve  a trade off between  growth  and stabilization 5. What policy
choices  affected  were the time profile  of output declines,  not their cumulative  decline  since  the
structural  demand  shift  was a permanent  event. Given  this situation,  status  quo, or non-reform  was
not a policy  choice. This also implied  that delaying  reforms  would  not improve  output  performance
and it is in this sense rapid reforms  are desirable. Clearly  and with the benefit of hindsight,  the
5  Bruno  and  Easterly  (1994)  and Easterly  (1996)  show  that  stabilization  programs  do not necessarily  involve
output  losses. In fact,  Easterly  shows  that  most  stabilization  programs  are expansionary.
12issue was not fast reform versus gradual reform for growth performance and inflation performance
but one of trade-off between reforms and growth and inflation.
V.  ECONOMIC GROWTH POTENTIAL IN THE LONG TERM
Section IH analyzed the determinants of growth during the transition period using cross
country regression equations.  The results are indicative of  this  period and  they are  literally
transitory findings.  Further, as economies move along, the explanatory power of independent
variables used in equation 1 will be diminished.  Hence, a longer run growth potential analysis
would require standard growth determinants type of analysis.  However, sufficient time has not
passed yet to estimate meaningful long term growth equations for transition economies.
Given this problem, we adopt the approach used by Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996), which
relies on the existing cross-country growth determinants found in Barro (1991), and Levine and
Renelt (1992). Fischer et al carry out such analysis for 15 of the 26 transition countries considered
in this study.  In this paper, their analysis is extended for all 26 transition economies in EE and
FSU.  The basic strategy is to use coefficients estimated by Levine and Renelt (LR) and estimate
growth rates for transition economies as a function of initial conditions and control variables that
condition the long run growth process in the neo-classical models of growth. Our analysis draws on
LR because their analysis includes variables that are shown to be robust in various specifications of
the growth equation.
The long run growth determinants for the 26 countries under study are presented in
table 5.  Data sources are given under each variable heading in the same table.  The equation used
to estimate future growth rates takes the following form:
13gp(t)  = f( Y(O),  SSE(O),  IN(t),  PGR(t))
In this formulation  gp(t) is the growth rate of per capita income. Y(O)  is the initial per
capita income,  SSE(O)  is the secondary  school  enrollment  ratio measured  as a percentage  of the
total secondary  school aged population,  IN(t) is the ratio of physical investment  to GDP, and
PGR(t)  is the population  growth  rate.  It is expected  that  the per capita  growth  rate, gp, would  have  a
negative  relationship  to (YO). This is due to the neoclassical  convergence  hypothesis  which  posits
that poorer  countries  should  grow faster  than  the richer countries  holding  everything  else constant.
SSE is included  to capture  human  capital's  impact  on growth and it is expected  that this variable
would  have  a positive  relationship  to gp. As shown  in the literature  higher  investment  rates  tend  to
increase  growth  rates  although  the efficiency  of investment  is also important. PGR is expected  to
have  a negative  relationship  with gp.
As shown in table 5, there are large differences  across countries  in terms of per capita
income. This is even  true for the FSU countries  which  shows  the former  Union  was not successful
in reducing  gp differences  among  its constituents.  It is clear that the EE countries  and the Baltics
are closer to middle income counties than most of the FSU.  Investment  levels declined from
previous  highs as noted already  and as of 1994  averaged  around  25 percent of GDP which  seems
reasonable.  It is however  relatively  low  in Albania,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Macedonia,  and Poland. On
the other hand they are unrealistically  high in Belarus  and Turkmenistan  which is probably  due to
measurement  problems.
14As  noted by Fischer et al (1996), the most interesting feature of this table  is the high
secondary school enrollment ratios.  This  reflects the  importance attached to  education under
socialism and  should be regarded as a potential source for growth.  While this  is so, what is
important is to realize that there will be different skill needs under a market based system and all
transition economies will continue to need to invest in human capital.
Population growth rates show a significant degree of variation across countries.  The EE
and Baltics have low growth rates while some parts of the FSU, mostly Central Asian countries,
have rates.  This suggests higher growth rates for the EE and Baltics and lower for the Central
Asian states.
Using this data and the coefficients of the Levine and Renelt equation, given below, per
capita growth rates could be forecasted.
gp = -0.83 - 0.35Y(1960) - 0.38POP + 3.17SEC + 17.5INV
where Y(1960) refers to the initial level of real per capita income at international prices,
POP is the growth rate of the population, SEC is the secondary school enrollment rate, and INV is
the share of investment in GDP.
The results are also presented in table 5.  There are again significant variations among the
countries but on average the forecasted growth rate seems to be around 5 percent.  The results are
mostly in  line with our expectations.  Countries with higher investment in human capital and
physical capital are forecasted to grow faster.
15Using these results, it is not difficult  to estimate  the number of years it would  take these
countries  to reach current OECD levels of income per capita. While this exercise  maybe  more
relevant  for the EE and the Baltics,  it nevertheless  provides  some idea how long it may take the
FSU countries  if their objective  is to enjoy per capita income levels similar to the OECD. The
results  are presented  in table 6.  It is clear that it would  take most EE and Baltic countries  between
20 and 25 years.  Russia and Belarus  also fall in this range.  On the other hand, given initial
conditions  and economic  policies  it would  take most other  FSU longer,  on average  about  45 years.
Given the parameter  values in the Levine and Renelt growth equation  various simulation
exercises  could be performed  by changing  the variables  (levels  or growth  rates) included  in the
study. In this paper,  the focus is on investment 6. In particular  we ask the question:  what would  be
the impact of raising growth to 30 percent of GDP from its current levels?  The result, also
presented  in table 6, show  substantial  change  in long  term growth  rates,  which  is expected.  In some
cases, the differences  are drastic.  For example,  Armenia's  per capita growth rate jumps to 5.8
percent  from  2.3 percent  which  in turn reduces  the number  of years  to converge  to OECD  levels  by
55. This shows  the sensitivity  of growth  rates  to changes  in investment  and is a clear  indication  that
transition  countries  should  aim  to save  more  and invest  more.
VI. POLICY  ISSUES  AND CONCLUSIONS
6  For the countries  that  already  had  investment  ratios  above  30 percent  this  exercise  was  not performed.
16The main findings of this paper are that reforns  in transition economies were successful in
reducing inflation and restoring growth.  Important as they are, these findings, however, can not
explain the transition experience. The question was how to respond to the advent of transition and
this is where most  countries in EE differed from the FSU, with the exception of Baltics.  As
explained in the paper, the EE countries rapidly moved with reforms while the FSU countries were
in general, late in developing reform programs and implementing  them. But why so?
The crucial  difference which  largely  determined  economic policy  choices  or  reform
strategies was the political change.  It is no secret that almost all EE countries and the Baltics
wanted to break away from communism and FSU domination, and transition there in was first
characterized by political change.  Communists were discredited and removed from power which
gave rise to  a  "period  of  extraordinary politics"  which provided the window  opportunity for
reforms. (Balcerowicz and Gelb, 1994).  The collapse of the FSU, onthe other hand,  was different.
Vhile there were indications of discontent with the Union, with the exception of the Baltics, these
were not as strong as in the EE countries and there were explicit demands for independence. More
importantly,  when the FSU collapsed, this did not lead to a political change in most FSU states.
Given  this,  rather  than  reforming  quickly,  the  former  communists  hoped  that  the
Commonwealth  of Independent States (CIS), which was set up after the collapse of the FSU, would
evolve into a loose federation so that trade and financial links would not disappear. In fact, until the
Russian Federation issued new rubles and forced out other countries out of the ruble zone in late
1993 many countries did not want implement policies that were too different than Russia's.  What
political leaders did not realize at the time, however, was the permanent nature of the change which
17required adjustment. In short, the reform choices were heavily conditioned by the countries' politics
and their perceptions and aspirations.
Most clear evidence is the behavior of Baltics.  Sharing very similar production structure
with other FSU states they left the Union early in the process.  Following this, they adopted their
currencies and were successful in stabilizing their economies. This is quite telling.  All ruble zone
countries had the option of moving out of it but did not do so until late 1993.  In fact, there is a
quickening of pace of reforms after the collapse of the ruble zone in the FSU.  As this experience
show, knowing where to go has been an important detenninant of reforms.  The EE and Baltics,
wanting to join the European Union (EU) and encouraged by it, first initiated political change
which in turn led to reforms.  Most FSU countries, not fully knowing whom to align themselves
with  initially saw no other country other than the Russian Federation, which in  turn heavily
influenced their reforms.
Once reforms are launched, the outcomes are quite similar as this paper showed.  Growth
starts about two full years after stabilization although the FSU took about a year longer.  This
suggests, initial conditions,  which are  shown to be important in this paper are relevant factors in
the process of transition.
Longer term prospects seem more favorable for the EE and the Baltics in the short to
medium term.  Nevertheless, they still have a catching up to do with the OECD countries as our
results showed.  However, if they are admitted to the EU, which seems likely after the year 2000,
they may attain high growth rates even in the longer term.  The FSU countries have even more
catching up to do than the EE countries.  In the short to medium term countries with  slower
population growth rates and strong reform efforts could be expected to enjoy rapid rates of growth
18per capita. The Central  Asian countries  have relatively  high population  rates and this is likely  to
affect  their per capita growth  rates  negatively  in the short to medium  term.  What this suggests  is
that they need high economic  growth rates, exceeding  their population  growth rates,  a clear
indication  that  there is not much room for slowing reforms.  Furhter, given the benefits of
integration,  there is a strong  case for Central  Asian  countries  to push for an economic  union,  which
would  also facilitate  the resructuring  of their  econornies.
19TABLE 1:
Liberalization, and Growth, 1989-95
CLI  Annual  Outout  Growth  Av growth  93/94  GDP  Lowest  level
Group  Countries  1995  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  93/94  /89 GDP  of GDP189  GDP
Advanced  Slovenia  5.01  -2.70  -4.70  -8.10  -5.40  1.30  5.50  4.00  3.0  84  81
Reformers  Poland  5.03  0.20  -11.60  -7.00  2.60  3.80  6.00  6.50  4.2  88  82
Hungary  5.04  0.70  -3.50  -11.90  -3.00  -0.80  2.90  1.70  0.0  81  80
Czech Rep.  4.54  1.40  -1.20  -14.20  -6.40  -0.90  2.60  4.80  0.8  81  80
Slovakia  4.39  4.50  -0.40  -15.90  -6.70  -4.70  4.80  7.40  0.4  79  77
Averages  4.80  0.82  -4.28  -11.42  -3.78  -0.26  4.36  4.88  1.7  83  80
High  Bulgaria  3.57  -0.50  -9.10  -11.70  -7.30  -2.40  1.40  2.50  -1.4  73  73
Intermediate  Estonia  3.86  -1.10  -3.60  -11.90  -21.60  -8.40  3.00  4.00  0.9  69  67
Refomers  Lithuania  3.58  1.50  -5.00  -13.40  0.00  -18.40  1.00  3.50  -7.3  44  44
Latvia  3.26  3.00  -2.30  -11.10  -35.20  -14.80  2.00  0.40  -4.4  60  59
Romania  3.00  -5.80  -7.40  -12.90  -8.80  1.30  3.90  6.90  2.2  69  67
Albania  3.04  9.80  -10.00  -28.00  -7.20  9.60  9.40  8.60  9.5  74  65
Mongolia  2.94  4.20  -2.00  -9.20  -9.50  -3.00  2.10  6.30  0.6  84  83
Averages  3.32  1.59  -5.63  -14.03  -12.80  -5.16  3.26  4.60  0.03  68  65
Low  Russia  2.61  3.00  -2.00  -12.90  -19.00  -12.00  -15.00  -4.00  -13.5  57  52
Intermediate  Kyrgyzstan  2.63  3.00  4.00  -5.00  -19.30  -16.10  -26.20  1.30  -13.2  61  57
Reformers  Moldova  2.30  8.80  -1.50  -18.00  -29.10  -1.20  -31.20  -3.10  -17.0  53  46
Kazakhstan  1.88  -0.40  -0.40  -18.80  -13.90  -12.00  -25.00  -8.90  -18.5  57  49
Averages  2.36  3.60  0.03  -13.68  -20.33  -10.33  -24.35  -3.68  -15.6  57  51
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.64  3.70  4.30  -0.90  -11.00  -2.40  -3.50  -1.20  -2.5  89  88
Reformers  Belarus  1.55  7.90  -3.20  -1.20  -9.60  -10.70  -19.10  -10.20  -16.6  73  64
Ukraine  1.31  4.10  -3.60  -11.90  -17.00  -13.00  -21.80  -11.40  -18.6  56  48
Turkmenistar  0.85  -7.00  -2.30  -4.80  -5.30  -10.20  -20.00  -13.90  -15.0  69  62
Averages  1.34  2.18  -1.20  -4.70  -10.73  -9.08  -16.10  -9.18  -13.2  72  66
Affected  Croatia  4.83  -1.50  -8.50  -20.90  -9.70  -3.70  0.80  -1.50  -0.7  69  68
by War  FYR  Macedo 4.70  0.90  -9.70  -10.70  -21.10  -8.40  -8.20  -3.00  -10.7  57  55
Armenia  2.02  14.20  -7.20  -11.80  -52.30  -14.80  5.30  5.00  -7.4  38  38
Georgia  1.81  -4.80  -12.40  -20.60  -44.80  -25.40  -11.30  -5.00  -24.6  24  23
Azerbaijan  1.47  -4.40  -11.70  -0.70  -22.10  -23.10  -21.10  -13.20  -17.7  50  44
Tajikistan  1.34  -2.90  -1.60  -7.10  -29.00  -11.00  -21.50  -12.50  -26.3  35  30
Averages  2.70  0.25  -8.52  -11.97  -29.83  -14.40  -9.33  -5.03  -14.5  45  34
East  Viet Nam  4.07  8.5  145  100
Asia  China  3.67  11.7  157  100
Averages  3.87  10.1  151  100
Note:  CLI  = cumulative  liberalization  index.
Source:  De Melo,  Denizer,  Gelb (1996)
20TABLE  2:
Inflation Experience by Reform Group, 1989-95
1995  Geometric
Cumul  Inflation  average
Group  Countries  Lib Index  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  89-94
Advanced  Slovenia  5.01  1306.0  549.7  117.7  201.0  32.0  19.8  12.8  213.3
Reformers  Poland  5.03  251.0  586.0  70.3  43.0  35.3  32.2  27.8  117.2
Hungary  5.04  17.0  29.0  34.2  22.9  22.5  19.0  28.2  24.0
Czech Republic  4.54  2.3  10.8  56.7  11.1  20.8  10.2  9.1  17.5
Slovak Republic  4.39  0.0  10.8  61.2  10.1  23.0  14.0  9.9  18.4
Averages  4.80  315.3  237.3  68.0  57.6  26.7  19.0  17.6  78.1
High  Bulgaria  3.57  6.0  22.0  333.5  82.0  72.8  89.0  62.1  79.4
Intermediate  Estonia  3.86  6.1  23.1  210.6  1069.0  89.0  48.0  28.3  125.8
Reformers  Lithuania  3.58  2.1  8.4  224.7  1020.3  390.2  72.0  36.5  164.1
Latvia  3.26  4.7  10.5  124.4  951.2  109.0  36.0  25.1  106.5
Romania  3.00  1.1  5.1  174.5  210.9  256.0  131.0  32.0  105.2
Albania  3.04  0.0  0.0  35.5  225.9  85.0  28.0  7.8  47.9
Mongolia  2.94  0.0  0.0  208.6  321.0  183.0  145.0  56.8  111.7
Averages  3.32  2.9  9.9  187.4  554.3  169.3  78.4  35.5  105.8
Low  Russia  2.61  2.2  5.6  92.7  1353.0  896.0  220.0  190.2  214.3
Intermediate  Kyrgyz Republic  2.63  0.0  3.0  85.0  854.6  1208.7  280.0  42.8  211.0
Reformers  Moldova  2.30  0.0  4.2  98.0  1276.0  789.0  327.0  30.2  220.2
Kazakhstan  1.88  0.0  4.2  91.0  1610.0  1760.0  1980.0  176.3  385.9
Averages  2.36  0.6  4.3  91.7  1273.4  1163.4  701.8  109.9  257.8
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.64  0.7  3.1  82.2  645.0  534.0  746.0  304.6  201.8
Reformers  Belarus  1.55  1.7  4.5  83.5  969.0  1188.0  2200.0  709.0  328.3
Ukraine  1.31  2.0  4.0  91.2  1210.0  4735.0  842.0  376.4  379.2
Turkmenistan  0.85  2.1  4.6  102.5  492.9  3102.0  2400.0  1261.5  366.2
Averages  1.34  1.6  4.1  89.9  829.2  2389.8  1547.0  662.9  318.9
Affected  Croatia  4.83  2520.5  135.6  249.5  938.2  1516.0  98.0  2.0  544.5
by War  FYR Macedonia  4.70  1246.0  120.5  229.7  1925.2  248.0  65.0  17.4  374.3
Armenia  2.02  0.0  10.3  100.0  825.0  3732.0  5458.0  176.8  492.9
Georgia  1.81  0.0  3.3  78.5  913.0  3126.0  18000.0  169.0  591.2
Azerbaijan  1.47  0.0  7.8  105.6  616.0  833.0  1500.0  411.7  265.1
Tajikistan  1.34  0.0  4.0  111.6  1157.0  2195.0  452.0  635.4  289.7
Averages  2.70  627.8  46.9  145.8  1062.4  1941.7  4262.2  235.4  426.3
East  Viet Nam  4.07  76.0  67.5  67.6  17.5  5.2  14.4  38.3
Asia  China  3.67  17.5  1.6  3.0  5.4  13.0  12.0  8.6
Averages  3.87  46.8  34.6  35.3  11.5  9.1  13.2  23.4
Sources: World  Bank, IMF and (De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996)
21TABLE 3:
Sectoral Shifts at Constant Prices, 1989-94
Change  in share
Cumul  % of GDP
Group  Countries  Lib Index  Industry  Agrculture  Services
Advanced  Sloveniaw  5.01  -23.3  -3.8  27.1
Reformers  Poland at  5.03  -21.4  -2.0  23.4
Hungary  5.04  -0.2  -1.7  1.9
Czech Republic  4.54  -10.5  -0.5  11.0
Slovak Republic  4.39  -14.8  0.2  14.6
Averages  4.8  -14.0  -1.6  15.6
High  Bulgaria  3.57  -10.3  4.3  6.0
Intermediate  Estonia J  3.86  -12.7  -10.1  22.8
Reformers  Lithuania  a  3.58  -11.5  2.6  8.9
Latvia a/  3.26  -18.8  1.9  16.9
Romania  3.00  -6.5  6.2  0.3
Albania  3.04  -20.1  14.8  5.3
Mongolia  2.94  3.0  4.3  -7.3
Averages  3.3  -11.0  3.4  7.6
Low  Russia '  2.61  3.5  6.5  -10.0
Intermediate  Kyrgyz Republic  2.63  -7.8  7.2  0.6
Reformers  Moldova  2.30  3.5  6.5  -10.0
Kazakhstan  1.88  -6.3  17.5  -11.2
Averages  2.4  -1.8  9.4  -7.7
Slow  Uzbekistan  a'  1.64  -7.6  12.7  -5.1
Reformers  Belarus at  1.55  5.8  -2.8  -3.0
Ukraine  1.31  -11.2  10.0  1.2
Turkmenistan  c'  0.85  -4.5  0.1  4.4
Averages  1.3  -4.4  5.0  -0.6
Affected  Croatia  4.83  -4.0  0.8  3.2
by War  FYR Macedonia  4.70  9.1  -6.0  -3.1
Armenias  2.02  -6.4  0.0  6.4
Georgia  1.81  -8.7  18.3  -9.6
Azerbaijan  1.47  -14.8  0.2  14.6
Tajikistan  1.34  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Averages  3.0  -5.0  2.7  2.3
East  Viet Nam  4.07  -1.1  -6.0  7.1
Asia  China  3.67  18.6  -6.1  -12.5
Averages  3.9  8.8  -6.1  -2.7
a/  Change  over 1989-93
b/ Change  over  1989-92
c/ Change  over 1989-91
22TABLE 4:
Registered  Unemployment  through  Transition
(as percentage  of labor  force, end of year)
Group  Country  CLI  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Advanced  Slovenia  a  5.01  2.9  4.7  8.2  11.1  14.5  14.5
Reformers  Poland  5.03  0.1  6.1  11.8  13.6  16.4  16.0
Hungary  5.04  0.3  2.5  8.0  12.3  12.1  10.9
Czech  Republic  4.54  0.0  0.8  4.1  2.6  3.5  3.2
Slovakia  4.39  0.0  1.5  11.8  10.4  14.4  14.8
Averages  4.80  0.7  3.1  8.8  10.0  12.2  11.9
High  Bulgaria  3.57  0.0  1.5  11.1  15.3  16.4  12.8
Intermediate  Estonia  3.86  0.0  0.0  0.1  4.8  8.8  8.1
Reformers  Lithuania  3.58  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.3  4.4  3.8
Latvia  3.26  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.1  5.3  6.5
Romania  3.00  0.0  0.0  3.0  8.4  10.2  10.9
Albania  3.04  1.9  7.7  8.6  26.9  28.9  19.5
Averages  3.4  0.3  1.5  3.9  9.8  12.3  10.3
Low  Russia  2.61  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8  1.1  2.2
Intermediate  Kyrgyzstan  2.63  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7
Reformers  Moldova  2.30  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.8  1.2
Kazakhstan  1.88  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.6  1.0
Averages  2.36  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.7  1.3
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.64  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3
Reformers  Belarus  1.55  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.5  1.5  2.1
Ukraine  1.31  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.4
Turkmenistan  0.85  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.a.
Averages  1.34  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.9
Affected  Croatia  4.83  0.0  9.3  15.5  17.8  17.5  18.0
by War  FYR  Macedonia  /  4.70  n.a.  n.a.  18.0  19.0  19.0  19.0
Armenia  2.02  1.0  1.0  3.5  3.5  6.2  5.6
Georgia  1.81  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  8.4  n.a.
Azerbaijan  1.47  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.9
Tajikistan  1.34  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.1  1.7
23Group  Country  CLI  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Averages  2.70  0.2  1.7  6.2  7.7  8.8  9.0
East  Viet Nam  4.07  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
Asia  China  3.67  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.3  2.6  2.8
Averages  3.87  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a
Source:  De Melo,  Denizer,  Gelb  (1996).
24TABLE  5:
Levels  and Change  in Revenue,  Expenditures  and Fiscal Balance,  1989-94
Changein  Levels,  1994
Cumul  (%  of GDP)  (%  of GDP)
Group  Countries  Lib  Index Revenue Expenditure Balance  Revenue Expenditure Balance
Advanced  Slovenia  4.16  4.6  5.8  -1.2  46.6  47.5  -0.9
Reformers  Poland  4.14  6.5  1.5  5.0  47.9  50.4  -2.5
Hungary  4.11  -6.8  -1.7  -5.1  52.3  58.8  -6.5
Czech  Republic  al  3.61  -10.9  -13.8  2.9  51.2  50.7  0.5
Slovak  Republic  al  3.53  -11.6  -11.5  -0.1  50.5  53.0  -2.5
Averages  3.91  -3.6  -3.9  0.3  49.7  52.1  -2.4
High  Bulgaria  2.96  -21.9  -17.3  -4.6  38.0  44.1  -6.1
Intermediate  Estonia  2.93  -8.0  -7.5  -0.5  35.0  35.0  0.0
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  -25.2  -17.1  -8.1  25.1  30.4  -5.3
Latvia  2.39  -15.1  -12.3  -2.8  36.7  38.7  -2.0
Romania  2.35  -18.5  -7.1  -11.4  32.6  35.6  -3.0
Albania  2.30  -20.3  -16.0  -4.3  27.7  41.0  -13.3
Mongolia  2.27  -12.4  -17.3  5.0  36.2  48.0  -11.8
Averages  2.55  -11.3  -13.5  -3.8  33.0  39.0  -5.9
Low  Russia  1.90  -4.5  -4.4  -0.1  36.3  45.1  -8.8
Intermediate  Kyrgyz  Republic  1.81  -14.2  -3.7  -10.4  24.3  32.7  -8.4
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  -18.2  -7.8  -7.1  17.1  25.9  -8.8
Kazakhstan  1.31  -21.7  -15.7  -6.0  19.0  23.5  -4.5
Averages  1.66  -14.6  -7.9  -5.9  24.2  31.8  -7.6
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  7.8  9.2  -1.4  43.0  45.0  -2.0
Reformers  Belarus  1.07  -1.6  3.4  -1.5  36.6  38.1  -1.5
Ukraine  0.80  15.9  25.7  -8.4  42.3  51.4  -9.1
Turkmenistan  0.63  -26.2  -23.9  -2.3  6.2  7.3  -1.1
Averages  0.90  -1.0  3.6  -3.4  32.0  35.6  -3.4
Affected  Croatia  b/  4.02  12.3  8.1  4.1  27.2  27.6  -0.4
by  War  FYR  Macedonia  3.92  6.6  5.6  1.1  42.8  45.4  -2.6
Armenia  1.44  -15.2  11.2  -21.6  37.0  61.0  -24.0
Georgia  1.32  -16.5  -6.6  -8.1  15.0  24.0  -9.0
Azerbaijan  1.03  10.2  24.7  -11.5  36.0  49.0  -13.0
Tajikistan  0.95  -4.9  -0.5  -1.0  35.4  38.1  -2.7
Averages  2.11  -1.2  7.1  -6.2  32.2  40.9  -8.6
East  Viet  Nam  3.42  8.7  -3.2  5.5  24.7  25.2  -0.5
Asia  China  3.08  -5.1  -4.7  -0.4  11.4  13.3  -1.9
Averages  3.25  1.8  -2.2  2.5  18.1  19.3  -1.2
a/ 1989  figures  for Czechoslovakia.
bI Change  over  1991-94
Soufce:  IMF,  World Bank,  De  Melo,  Denizer  and  Gelb  (1996).
25TABLE  6:
Money,  Interest  Rates  and Real  Balances
Broad Money
Growth
Cumul  (Average  Monthly  Real Money  Balances  Discount  Rate in Real
Group  Countries  Lib Index  Change  1992-94)  1991=100  Terms, percent  (average)
92  93  94  1992-1994  end-1994
Advanced  Slovenia  4.16  5  92  127  164  -3  -1
Reformers  Poland  4.14  3  98  101  104  1  3
Hungary  4.11  2  105  106  102  0  1
Czech  Republic i'  3.61  1  106  104  111  -1  -1
Slovak Republic '  3.53  1  95  84  86  -1  -1
Averages  3.91  2  99  104  113  -1  0
High  Bulgaria  2.96  4  91  76  68  -3  0
Intermediate  Estonia f'  2.93  7  25  20  21  n/a  -3
Reformers  Lithuania  2.62  9  30  17  20  n/a  n/a
Latvia  2.39  6  29  28  34  -8  0
Romania!y  2.35  7  63  43  41  -8  12
Albania  2.30  5 bl  82  89  105  -4  2
Mongolia  5'  2.27  6h/  56  36  40  -16  -8
Averages  2.55  6  54  44  47  -8  1
Low  Russia  1.92  15  32  23  16  -17  -2
Intermediate  Kyrgyz  Republic  1.81  11  36  16  8  -19  9
Reformers  Moldova  1.62  13  23  9  3  -18  0
Kazakhstan  1.31  19  21  14  8  -31  4
Averages  1.67  15  28  16  9  -21  3
Slow  Uzbekistan  1.11  19  45  53  71  -35  -12
Reformers  Belarus  1.07  20  35  33  17  -34  -5
Ukraine  0.80  22  40  26  13  -29  -40
Turkmenistan  0.63  23  63  73  9  -45  -48
Averages  0.90  21  46  46  28  -36  -26
Affected  Croatia  !  4.02  16  68  60  76  -9  2
by War  FYR Macedonia  3.92  19!c  89  91  89  -1  1
Armenia  1.44  24  22  7  2  -33  -26
Georgia  1.32  29  29  24  6  n/a  n/a
Azerbaijan  1.03  17  40  40  19  -40  -52
Tajikistan  0.95  19  39  30  n/a  -30  -16
Averages  2.11  21  48  42  39  -23  -18
East  Viet Nam !  3.42  n/a  97  107  n/a  1  0.6
Asia  China  3.08  2!'  123  141  168  -5  -5
Averages  3.25  n/a  110  124  nla  -2  -2.2
NB:  The discount  rates in real terms are calculated  assuming  quarterly  compounding.  All averages  are
simple  averages.
a/ Data  for 1992 are for the federation.
b/ Broad  money growth  rate is taken from a quarterly average  made monthly  by taking a cubic root.
c/ The average  discount  rate is for 1992-93. For  Vietnam,  the lending  rate for working capital  is used.
d/ The rates for 1992-93  are decompounded  on monthly  basis.
e/ Average  interest  rate collected  over different  types  of credit.
f/ The NBE  credit auction rate is used  for end 1994.
g/ The discount  rate used  is the clearing  and settlement  account;  a mid point  of range is used.
Source: De  Melo, Denizer  and Gelb (1996).
26TABLE  7:
Fiscal  Deficits  and  Quasi-Fiscal  Expenditures  for Selected  Countries,  1992-94
(as percentage  of GDP)
Fiscal  Deficits  CB Implicit  Subsidya)  Total
1992  1993  1994  1992  1993  1994  1992  1993  1994
Advanced  Reformers
Poland  6.8  2.9  2.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.8  2.9  2.9
Hungary  5.7  7.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.7  7.0  6.5
Czech  Republicb)  0.5  -0.6  -0.5  0.3  0.8  0.1  0.8  0.2  -0.4
Slovakiab) 13.1  7.6  2.5  0.3  1.7  0.0  13.4  9.3  2.5
Intermediate Reformers
Bulgaria  5.0  11.1  6.1  1.3  0.8  0.7  6.3  11.9  6.8
Estonia  c)  -0.5  1.4  0.0  - 0.2  0.3  - 1.6  0.3
Romania  5.5  1.0  3.0  5.9  3.9  0.0  11.4  4.9  3.0
Russiac)  3.4  8.1  8.8  11.3  1.7  0.0  14.7  9.8  8.8
Kazakhstan  7.3  1.2  4.5  32.7  2.6  40.0  7.1
Slow Reformers
Belarusc)  6.4  9.4  1.5  26.5  9.3  3.4  32.9  18.7  4.9
Turkmenistanc) 10.1  3.6  1.1  12.5  21.2  6.4  22.6  24.8  7.5
Uzbekistanc) 10.2  8.4  2.0  13.1  18.5  19.0  23.3  26.9  21.0
a) Implicit  subsidy  from the  Central  Bank  to commercial  banks  and  economy  due to difference  between  the Central  Bank
refinancing  rate  and inflation.  Annual  figures  are averages  of monthly  (quarterly)  figures
b) For 1992  the nominal  federation  subsidy  is divided  2 to 1 in favor of  the Czech  Republic.
c) Calculations  done  on quarterly  basis.
27Table 8.  Forecasting  Long-term  Trend  Growth  (Levine-Renelt)
Population Secondary School  Gross  Per Capita  Forecasted  Forecasted
Growth  Enrollment  Capital Formation  Income  Per Capita  Growth
Rate  (share of school  (share of GDP)  in US$  Growth  Rate
age population  in current prices  PPP based  Rate
(WB)  (WB, KZ)  (OECD, WEO)  (WB, IMF)
1. Albania  1.19  0.79  0.17  495  4.08  5.27
2.  Azerbaijan  1.28  0.83  0.24  1720  4.83  6.10
3.  Bulgaria  -0.35  0.71  0.12  4280  2.16  1.80
4.  Croatia  0.06  0.80  0.10  3872  1.99  2.06
5.  Czech Republic  -0.06  0.89  0.31  7940  4.66  4.60
6.  Estonia  -0.31  0.92  0.30  6634  5.18  4.86
7.  Hungary  -0.53  0.81  0.23  7010  3.51  2.98
8.  Latvia  -0.53  0.92  0.18  5170  3.63  3.10
9.  Macedonia, FYR  1.12  0.80  0.38  1604  7.28  8.40
10. Moldova  0.41  0.81  0.12  2270  2.94  3.35
11. Poland  0.20  0.83  0.16  5480  2.59  2.79
12. Romania  0.19  0.80  0.30  2950  5.80  5.99
13. Russia  0.55  0.92  0.26  4510  4.83  5.38
14. Slovak Republic  0.35  0.96  0.22  6730  3.63  3.98
15. Slovenia  0.41  0.80  0.25  5982  3.78  4.19
16. Armenia  1.40  0.85  0.10  2204  2.31  3.74
17. Belarus  0.20  0.92  0.35  4830  6.44  6.66
18. Georgia  -0.20  0.82  0.32  1354  6.97  6.76
19. Kazakhstan  0.10  0.90  0.24  2946  5.15  5.26
20. Kyrgyz Republic  0.40  0.88  0.30  2358  6.23  6.66
21. Lithuania  0.00  0.78  0.18  3551  3.55  3.55
22. Tajikistan  2.00  0.73  0.22  993  4.28  6.36
23. Turkmenistan  4.60  0.70  0.46  2939  6.66  11.57
24. Ukraine  0.00  0.80  0.35  3149  6.79  6.79
25. Uzbekistan  2.20  0.94  0.23  2293  4.54  6.84
26. Mongolia  1.90  0.78  0.21  2090  3.86  5.84
27. China  1.20  0.55  0.42  2510  6.93  8.21
28. Viet Nam  2.10  0.35  0.24  1040  3.32  5.49
Average  0.26  0.84  0.22  4443  4.06  4.32
Sources: International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  The  World Bank (WB), Organization  for Economic  Co-operation
and Development  (OECD),  and Krajnyak  and  Zettelmeyer  (KZ, 1996),  and authors estimates.
28Table  9. Forecasting  GDP  convergence  to  OECD  countries
Levine-Renelt
Per  Capita  Investment
Income  At  current  investment  =30  percent
in  US$  rates  (in  percent  of GDP)
(PPP  based)  Number  of  Number  of
Forecasted  years  to  Forecasted  years  to
(WB,  IMF:1994) Per  Capita  reach  current Per  Capita  reach  current
Growth  OECD  levels  Growth  OECD  levels
1. Albania  495  4.08  91  6.3  59
2. Azerbaijan  1720  4.83  51  5.96  41
3. Bulgaria  4280  2.16  69  5.31  28
4. Croatia  3872  1.99  80  5.58  29
5. Czech  Republic  7940  4.66  19  4.48  19
6. Estonia  6634  5.18  20  5.13  21
7. Hungary  7010  3.51  28  4.74  21
8. Latvia  5170  3.63  36  5.73  23
9. Macedonia,  FYR  1604  7.28  35  5.97  42
10.  Moldova  2270  2.94  73  6.04  36
11.  Poland  5480  2.59  48  5.06  25
12.  Romania  2950  5.8  33  5.85  32
13.  Russia  4510  4.83  30  5.55  26
14.  Slovak  Republic  6730  3.63  29  4.98  21
15.  Slovenia  5982  3.78  31  4.71  25
16.  Armenia  2204  2.31  93  5.81  38
17.  Belarus  4830  6.44  22  5.57
18.  Georgia  1354  6.97  39  6.62  41
19.  Kazakhstan  2946  5.15  37  6.2  31
20.  Kyrgyz  Republic  2358  6.23  34  6.23  34
21.  Lithuania  3551  3.55  47  5.65  30
22.  Tajikistan  993  4.28  70  5.63  54
23.  Turkmenistan  2939  6.66  29  3.86
24.  Ukraine  3149  6.79  27  5.85  31
25.  Uzbekistan  2293  4.54  47  5.76  37
26.  Mongolia  2090  3.86  58  5.44  41
27.  China  2510  6.93  30  4.83
28.  Viet  Nam  1040  3.32  88  4.37  67
Average  for  transition  4104  4.06  45  5.43  30
OECD  average  (1994)  18602  not  applicable
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